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A Multi-Country Evaluation of Trade Imbalances |
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April 1999
I. Introduction For more than 20 years except for the oil crises, Japan has been consistently running a current account surplus every year (Figure 4.1). And since 1980 from when the IMF's international financial statistics yearbook started to publish the numbers for international investment position, Japan has been always a creditor country (Figure 4.5) and nowadays the international financial assets per capita in Japan is largest in the world. Therefore, Japan definitely fits into the category of a net creditor country running a current account surplus. On the face of it, Japan looks to be in the best economic position any country can think of though, the implication regarding the current account surplus and foreign assets possessed by Japanese are rather complicated. From now on, I will examine whether the trade surplus which is huge enough to create a lot of tension with the other trading partners, is good, bad or benign for Japan by using other statistical data including international investment position and real GDP growth rate as well as trade related statistical data. II. Analysis Current Account Surplus As you can see in three figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, Japan's current account surplus stems from
merchandise trade surplus and income receipts from the overseas investments. If you look at only
the balance on service trade, you can notice that Japan has been always running service trade deficits
and net exports of
merchandise goods are
somewhat offset by net
imports of service goods.
As a result, it has become a
Japan's trade pattern that it
runs a huge merchandise
trade surplus and at the
same time a service trade
deficit. This is illustrating
that Japan is not
necessarily exporting
goods to the foreign
countries all the time, but it
is also importing a large
amount of service goods
from the other countries.
And it means that the Japanese service sector does not have much competitiveness relative to the
other countries.
Real GDP Growth Rate of Japan The real GDP measures how much the country produced in its domestic market in one year eliminating the effects of inflation on the real value of the products. Looking at Figure 4.4, you know that Japan has been recording positive real GDP growth rate since 1975, which means that Japanese economy has been continuously growing from over 20 years ago. But it does not mean that Japan has achieved a stable growth rate for that period. Average real GDP growth rate from 1971 to 1980 was 4.6 percentage point and that from 1981 to 1990 was 4.1 percentage point respectively. In the course of this 20 years, Japanese economy experienced big changes in the growth rates once in a while. Firstly in 1980, the real GDP grew much slower than earlier, mostly because of the second oil crisis and slowdown in the public investment. And secondly, in 1986 the real GDP growth rate again plunged. This time, the culprit for this plunge was the big adjustment of Yen and Dollar exchange rate in the international financial market and following depressed private investment. Through the Plaza Accord, the Yen jumped up by as much as 30 percentage point against the Dollar in a year and it hit the Japanese export and domestic business sector so much that this abrupt huge appreciation of Yen contributed to the drop in the real GDP growth rate in 1986.
When it comes to the assessment of the current account surplus, it is important to take into account the other data regarding to the economic growth over the years in order to see if the economy as itself is also growing in line with the large size of its current account surplus. If the large current account surplus is based on a country's strong economy, reflected by a strong domestic demand, that surplus does not pose any problem. But conversely, if the domestic demand is weak and a current account surplus is too large, its trade imbalance can be seen as a bad sign for the country. Therefore, no matter how much the country is earning foreign currencies from the other countries by export, it does not necessarily show what's exactly going on in the domestic market of the country. In the case of Japan after 1990, the large current account surplus has not corresponded to the GDP growth rate. So, we can not say that the reason for the huge surplus was coming from the excessive supply of the goods over the strong population's demand for them in the domestic market because the real GDP growth rate was slowing. Thus, we can find that during that period, a weak domestic demand has been the source of the huge Japanese current account surplus. In other words, a strong trade figures represents rather weak state of the Japanese economy. Net International Investment Position
Secondly, especially at a time when domestic interest rates are extremely low like now, the Japanese can benefit from the higher interest rates offered abroad and enjoy the higher returns than what they can get in the domestic market. As the people have started to live longer than ever and the birthrates are keeping falling down, currently young generation desperately needs to prepare for their retirement well because public and corporate pension schemes are likely to fail to give them sufficient benefits after they retire. However, the huge amount of investment in foreign countries contains several negative implications as well. One of them is that those investments are very much exposed to foreign exchange movements. Although Yen's appreciation may well contribute to driving people to hold foreign assets because every foreign goods starts to look cheaper than ever, if the appreciation proceeded too much and the currency in which the Japanese investment is denominated depreciated substantially, the value of the assets, after converted to Yen, would get shrunk and even go below the initial investment unless you hedge and capital gains are big enough to offset the exchange losses. In fact, from 1985 when the Yen- US dollar exchange rate was adjusted in the Plaza Accord, Yen significantly appreciated especially to the US dollar (Appendix 1). Because considerable amount of the Japanese Yen invested in the foreign financial assets was denominated in the US dollar, this excessive appreciation clearly reduced the value of the Japanese foreign assets to a great extent. Secondly, the foreign assets contain risks of price drops caused by the foreign financial market turmoil. If you don't diversify your investment portfolio into different kinds of assets and different currencies, you may incur financial losses from the foreign countries' financial problems. The same caution applies to the foreign direct investment as well. In this context, the huge investment assets abroad can make Japan's financial asset position fragile under some circumstances, exposing it to a lot of foreign factors which Japan can not manage on its own. In the end, increasing international investment, especially foreign direct investments abroad has the risks of hollowing the Japanese industries. Because investment is one of the main sources of future prosperity for the country, if many companies keep getting out of Japan through FDI, Japan may end up with fewer private investment in its domestic market and it will lead to less potential for the future economic growth based on that investment. Investment Rate toward GDP after 1973
During the bubble era, companies were scrambling to invest much money only to increase the already large production capacity and to increase the values of the property and securities which ended up with well above the fundamental values afterwards. Therefore, we need to be careful that the mere incident of large amount of domestic investment relative to GDP can not guarantee you anything about the economic growth that the country can enjoy in the long run, unless those investment are made in the right places. Private Consumption ( C ) and Government Spending ( G ) per Capita The first and foremost reason for this long lower real growth rate of private consumption is that the current recession was triggered from the very domestic factor which is failure to tackle with the fallout from the burst of the asset bubble by strong determination, not from the foreign factors such as oil crises and the rapid appreciation of Yen Japan had experienced in the history. That is, it has much to do with the Japanese economic structure as itself and unless the problems incorporated in the structure are solved, the economy does not recover and then, the private consumption can not increase, either. The examples of the problems regarding the Japanese economic structure are reluctance of the Japanese government to take necessary drastic measures to pull the country out of this recession, many regulations hampering innovation and bureaucratic system still wielding a strong influence in the markets and so on. Illustrated by the fact that despite a string of stimulus packages launched by the Japanese government, the private consumption does not seem to recover easily, Japan clearly needs to implement other measures to revive its economy not only from the demand side, but also from the supply side. III. Conclusion In 1997, Japan had real growth rates which were lower than those in 1996 in all domestic demand categories such as private consumption, private investment and government spending and in GDP.(1) As for private investment and government investment, the real growth rates were even negative. Therefore, in the short term, it is clear that Japan is facing a lot of difficulties to stimulate the domestic demand. If we regard the domestic demand as a yardstick of standard of living in the country, no matter how big the figure of the Japanese current account surplus is, it does not mean that Japan is enjoying a high level of standard of living at that period. But in the long term, the currently large current account surplus can be expected to play a big role. For, as I mentioned earlier, Japan is going to face a critical change of demography relatively soon, caused by lowering birthrates and longevity, therefore, high level of domestic saving represented by a huge current account surplus is very necessary for Japan to keep a standard of living at a reasonable level when the current workforce starts to retire. Since retirees tend to spend more than the workforce does, it may become real that Japan finally runs trade deficits. If this happens, Japanese may need to break up their savings they have been accumulating from the trade and rely on them to avoid lowering their standard of living. Therefore, the fact that Japan has been running a large mount of current account surplus right now can work very positively for the Japanese population in the long term. Summing up the favorable and unfavorable effects of the Japanese huge current account surplus, I would say that the surplus can be a positive and negative indicator for the Japanese economy, depending on the domestic economic situation in the short term. If the domestic demand, composed of private consumption and government spending and private investment, and real GDP growth rate are strong enough, the large current account surplus is nothing to worry, although there are several problems depending on which country you are looking at because for Japan, the real return for the domestic investment is not so high. But if the country is suffering from recession or ailing economy which is the case for Japan at this moment, the surplus is indicative of the low level of standard of living and therefore, the large size of current account surplus can be a problem. On the other hand, in the long term, the Japanese long running current account surplus is a good thing, considering forthcoming serious demographic change.
Work Cited International Financial Statistics Yearbook Vol. LI, 1998 Washington,DC : IMF Statistics Department, International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook Volume 48, Part 1 : Country Tables, 1997 Washington,DC : IMF Statistics Department, International Monetary Fund Comparative Economic and Financial Statistics, Japan and Other Major Countries, Tokyo : International Department, Bank of Japan, 1994 Currency Indices : JP Morgan & Co. Incorporated, 1999 Toyo - Keizai Tokei Geppo, Tokyo : Toyo - Keizai Shinpo - sha, 1998, 1999 Shukan Toyo - Keizai, Tokyo, Toyo - Keizai Shinpo - Sha, 1997 OECD Economic Outlook, Paris, OECD Publications, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
1. OECD Economic Outlook, December 1997, p67
©1999 The Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Last Updated on 10/9/99 |