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China's
exchange rate
Cock-a-doodle-doo
Feb 3rd 2005 From The Economist print
edition
The cure for America's trade deficit lies with its economic
policy, not China's exchange rate
ON FEBRUARY 9th
the Chinese new year begins: the year of the rooster. Many western policy
makers and businessmen hope that a new year will encourage new thinking in
Beijing to revalue the Chinese yuan, which is pegged to the falling
dollar. The yuan, it is widely argued, is grossly undervalued and
represents the biggest obstacle to a reduction in America's huge
current-account deficit. China has been invited to the G7 meeting of finance ministers and
central bankers in London this weekend, where it is likely to come under
pressure to adjust its exchange rate. But the G7 members should save their breath: not only would a
revaluation of the yuan have little impact on America's deficit, but the
more that foreigners pressure China to act, the harder it is for China do
so.
To begin with, it
is not obvious that the yuan is undervalued. The surge in China's
foreign-exchange reserves suggests that the yuan is being held down, but
this largely reflects short-term capital inflows from investors
speculating on a revaluation; these flows could go into reverse. Moreover,
if the yuan were set free and capital controls scrapped, the currency
might fall as Chinese households and firms diversified into foreign
assets. And while it is true that the yuan's trade-weighted value has
recently fallen along with the dollar, this follows a period when the yuan
was dragged up by a rising dollar: from 1994 to 2001 its real
trade-weighted exchange rate gained 30%. Given the uncertainty about the
yuan's correct level, it makes more sense to focus on how China can move
to a flexible exchange-rate regime—to which its government is
committed—than to insist on a specific yuan revaluation.
In any case, a
revaluation is not, as commonly claimed, the vital element needed to
shrink America's trade deficit. China accounts for only 10% of America's
total trade, so a 10% revaluation would reduce the dollar's trade-weighted
value by a mere 1%. More generally, although a fall in the dollar is
necessary to reduce America's deficit, it is not sufficient. The real
solution lies at home: the American government needs to borrow less and
households must save more and spend less.
On the other hand,
it is in China's own long-term interest to move to a more flexible
exchange rate. This would give it more control over monetary policy. By
fixing its currency to the dollar it is, in effect, being forced to adopt
America's overly lax policy. Inflation is not currently a problem (it has
fallen from 5% to 2.4% over the past six months), but ridiculously low
real interest rates in a fast-growing economy are likely to cause a
misallocation of credit and to fuel investment and property bubbles. A
more flexible exchange rate would also help to buffer the economy against
shocks. But the timing of any change is tricky. A modest currency
adjustment at a time of strong speculation could attract yet bigger
inflows of hot money, as investors bet on further appreciation. Last week,
Li Ruogu, the deputy governor of the central bank, made clear that China
would adopt a more flexible exchange rate, but in its own time, not under
pressure.
A first step
towards flexibility might be for China to peg the yuan to a basket of
currencies rather than to the dollar. One result would be China reducing
future purchases of American government bonds. Yields on these would rise.
This would, indeed, help to reduce America's trade deficit, but in a much
more painful way than those who call for a yuan revaluation have in mind.
The year of the rooster may yet deliver a wake-up call, but to America
rather than to China.
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